

CHAPTER TWO
Occupation and Settlement
The Great Dispute

In 1827 the flames of enthusiasm for Hudson's Bay Company operations in Oregon country were kindled once more. After prolonged months of Anglo-American meetings, negotiations deteriorated, and the conjoint occupation Treaty of 1818 was extended indefinitely. While hoping for a permanent resolution more favorable to British trade, that is, British sovereignty over the lands north of the Columbia River, Company officials nonetheless embraced the extension as a reprieve from the economic gallows. On January 16, 1828, Governor Simpson received a communique from the ebullient Board of Directors in London, outlining the course of action he was to follow in Oregon:

...the Country on the West of the Mountains remaining common to the Americans and us for an indefinite period, terminable by a years notice from either Government, it becomes an important object to aquire as ample an occupation of the Country and Trade as possible, on the South as well as on the North side of the Columbia River, looking always to the Northern side falling to our Share on a division, and to secure this, it

may be as well to have something to give up on the South, when the final arrangement comes to be made.¹

In Light of the Committee's renewed fervor for Oregon country, Governor Simpson decided to return to the Columbia district for a second tour of inspection. This sojourn, lasting from October 25, 1828, to March 25, 1829, stood out in stark contrast to his first visitation. Four years earlier, the Governor could only dream that the failing enterprise on the Columbia could one day become a thriving business. In his 1828 letters he reflected on the transformation of the Columbia department:

We did not expect any improvement in the trade by the removal of the Fort, on the contrary, it was thought by many, that the change of situation might be injurious; but the main object in view has been attained, that of rendering ourselves independent of Foreign aid in regard to the means of subsistence, which is here, perhaps more than any where else, the main Spring of the Business.²

Simpson's letters resounded with amazement and disbelief. He was aware that he had given McLoughlin an unreasonable agenda--to turn the tide on the Columbia from loss to profit, to achieve economic independence, and to transform Fort Vancouver into the locus of Company trade in Oregon. When he arrived at Fort Vancouver, Governor Simpson found a dramatic metamorphosis of the fledgling fort he had left some four years before.

In place of larders filled with costly imports, he found expansive company gardens and well-tended stock. Where he anticipated a dramatic decline in the beaver trade,

due to the inevitable exhaustion of supplies, Simpson found little change in quotas. While he feared the dramatic rise of Indian hostility and American competition, he found opponents held in check by vigorous controls on prices and supplies. If he expected to find the troops sitting idle throughout the off-season of trapping, he found them busily engaged at the saw-mill, the farm, and the Company stores. All of this had been accomplished with a work force far smaller than the force of 1824-25. Incredulous at the volume and quality of the activity at Fort Vancouver, the Governor wrote: "In short, never did a change of system, and a change of management, produce such obvious advantages in any part of the Indian country...."³

A confluence of factors, especially the extended territorial accord, and the unexpected stability of the Columbia department, brought kudos for Simpson and unprecedented levels of authority and independence for McLoughlin. Above all others, Chief Factor McLoughlin had breathed the spirit of life into the previously necrotic body of operations in Oregon country. With uncharacteristic enthusiasm, Governor Simpson acknowledged the accomplishments of McLoughlin in a carefully worded dispatch: "...Your whole administration is marked by its close adherence to the spirit of the Govr & Committees wishes and intentions...."⁴

A new era, marked by an infusion of support and enthusiasm for McLoughlin's administrative acumen, seemed to loom

on the horizon. While the Committee and the Governor may have felt that the Chief Factor's habits of business were unconventional, they could not deny the success of his endeavors. John McLoughlin basked in the light. Furthermore, he interpreted this rare gubernatorial approval as a carte blanche to stay his course. Now, unimpeded by Simpson's endless strictures, and relieved from threats of an imminent American takeover, McLoughlin proceeded to fashion the trade empire on his own terms.

Throughout this period of equanimity, Chief Factor McLoughlin recruited a retinue of skilled laborers to fortify the trade at Fort Vancouver. He sounded the call for cooks and coopers, millers and sawyers, carpenters, caulkers, surgeons, farmers, ship-builders, in short, for anyone with skill and the stamina to withstand the harsh conditions of frontier life. By 1830, McLoughlin restored the complement of laborers in his department to levels that exceeded the 1825 quota. An 1830 letter reviewed the roster of employees at work on the Columbia:⁵

At present we have at Fort Vancouver	62 men
Naval Depart	25 "
Fort Langley	15 men
" Colville	28 "
Thompsons River	17 "
Nez Percé	6 "
Mr. Ogden's Party	30 "
Mr. McLeod's	27 "
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	210 "

Letters of the same season, however, began to reveal a melancholy spirit dampening the Chief Factor's enthusiasm.

A litany of ills were rearing up against the Company in Oregon with Hydra-like vigor: new waves of competition from aggressive American traders; the disastrous loss of the Company ship William & Ann, attended by shortages of tradeable goods; and a virulent fever which sickened Company residents and annihilated the Indian population. These unforeseen difficulties dashed McLoughlin's hopes to escalate the trade and expand facilities at Fort Vancouver and its outposts. Instead, he and his remaining troops were forced to channel their efforts into the simple maintenance and defense of existing trade. The once confident doctor conveyed information regarding the waves of chaos and uncertainty at play in Oregon: "...not having a sufficient number of landmen in health to spare to complete the number required for Nass, I conceive it more adviseable to defer Establishing that place till Spring 1831...."⁶

In spite of the setbacks, John McLoughlin reassured his superiors of his allegiance to the Hudson's Bay Company objectives, and recanted his resolve to "promote the Interest of the concern as much as I possibly can."⁷ In the correspondence that followed McLoughlin's pledge of allegiance, however, were indications that he was departing from the Company's iron-clad policies. Like a youngster preparing his father for a failing grade report, John McLoughlin echoed back the words of approval the Board of Governors had given his administration: "...I am extremely

sensible of the approbation you are pleased to Express in the 22nd par. of yours on Octr. of my conduct managing the Business entrusted to my Charge...."⁸ The letter to which the Chief Factor referred contained the generous sentiments of the entire Committee regarding McLoughlin's innovative accomplishments in Oregon:

We notice with much satisfaction the success which has attended your exertions in Agricultural pursuits and raising Stock, and trust you will continue to procecute these objects, indeed your whole administration is marked by a degree of energy and zeal....⁹

John McLoughlin seized the opportunity to remind the Committee of their prodigious acclaim. He hoped that their positive review of his works would shield him from the heat of criticism as he set discordant plans and unauthorized innovations into motion. The Chief Factor knew that this seamless garment of the Hudson's Bay Company operations contained a serious flaw. Soon serious, irreconcilable differences would begin to drive a wedge between them.

The Hudson's Bay Company had maintained a monolithic and unwavering policy that permanent settlement at or near the Company outposts was anathema. Through carefully drafted legislation and swift action, the Committee obliterated their employees' most nascent attempts to permanently settle in fur country. They hired employees for specified periods of time, renewing the contracts of only those engages who were compliant with Company policies. The Committee maintained Company controlled stores to guarantee

against the rise of rival industry, regulated the flow of currency, and provided ample credit in exchange for service. After Governor Simpson came to power, retired employees were bribed or coerced away from even the most remote outposts. In a word, the Hudson's Bay Company destroyed the seeds of colonization before they could germinate in the rich soil of Oregon country.

Throughout the 1830s, the two-pronged question-- controlled occupation versus settlement--became a burning point of contention between Doctor John McLoughlin and the Board of Governors. Company officials grew more entrenched in their view that controlled occupation was the only option available to Company employees. They insisted that settlement was to be resisted at all costs. In the mind of the Committee, occupation was the only way to effectively control the lives of the people who resided in the fur lands. Under their system, the recalcitrant employee was regulated by harsh economic sanctions, while the obdurate or incorrigible could be expelled altogether. Under this system, none had legal recourse against the judgments of the Company. Controlled occupation gave the Hudson's Bay Company the upper hand in the lawless Oregon country.

Settlement, it was feared, would undermine the very purpose of the Company--profit through domination of the trade. Monopoly of the trade could never be attained in an atmosphere conducive to competition. Colonization was

viewed as a hotbed for the cultivation of independent industry, bringing with it the demise of a Company-controlled economy. More importantly, permanent settlement could spawn what officials feared the most--independent government among the colonizers. Officials feared that an independent government would not look with favor upon a profit-hungry, foreign-based enterprise. In the mind of the Committee, the alternatives were few, the waters charted. Controlled occupation was the only way to prolong the life of the Hudson's Bay Company in Oregon. However, enforcement of the monolithic policy was entirely dependent on one factor, the Chief Factor in each region. The assent and cooperation of the Chief Factor were the keystones of the structure. John McLoughlin proved to be a stumbling-block in the Committee's elaborate and expensive occupation policy.

During John McLoughlin's tenure in Oregon, the Governor expended vast sums of money to carry out his anti-settlement policies. To ensure against the creation of permanent colonies, and to keep Oregon country in a state of suspended animation, Governor Simpson and the London Committee relied on a two-pronged economic plan. All goods and commodities were either produced locally by the Company or imported on Company owned ships. Foreign goods were brought to Oregon via the Company's naval department, which was replete with ships, schooners, brigs, barques, steamers, and canoes. Though the naval department was costly to maintain,

officials felt that it helped to prevent the feared rise of industry and government.

As early as 1832, Governor Simpson began to entertain misgivings about his own ability to enforce the settlement and trade policy with John McLoughlin at the helm. In a highly secretive Book of Servant's Characters, the Governor confided his conflicting sentiments toward the Chief Factor on the Columbia. He described McLoughlin not only as "Very zealous in the discharge of his public duties and a man of strict honor and integrity" but also as "a disagreeable man to do business with as it is impossible to go with him in all things and a difference of opinion almost amounts to a declaration of hostilities...."¹⁰

The clandestine report, dated 1832, contained a curious mixture of odium and acclaim. In one breath, Simpson praised the Chief Factor as "active," "zealous," "of strict honor," "good hearted," and "pleasant." In the next, he expressed serious concern about the doctor's want of "system and regularity," his "ungovernable temper," and his "turbulent disposition." The most revealing aspect of the report was Simpson's characterization of McLoughlin as a "Radical in any Country under any Government and under any circumstances." Perhaps as early as 1832 the Governor was beginning to fear that the Chief Factor was drifting well beyond the letter and the "spirit of the Gov'r and Committees wishes."¹¹ At the beginning of the decade, Simpson sensed that McLoughlin

was embarking upon an administrative course that was radically different from the Company's tried and true path. The Governor had already experienced first hand the contempt that McLoughlin harbored against anyone who tried to commandeer control of operations on the Columbia. By 1832 Simpson was realizing that his own efforts to carry out Company policy in Oregon were being routed by the man the Committee had so recently heaped with praise. Simpson pondered over ways to harness this "Radical"¹² on the Columbia. Meanwhile McLoughlin began to cull and compromise even the most sacred policies of the Company.

The Company's maintenance of a complex maritime department was the bane of McLoughlin's sui generis administration. From the beginning of his tenure on the Columbia, he rejected the Company's belief that a navy was essential for the fur trade. McLoughlin felt that the navy was expensive and impractical. He abhorred the ineptness of its officers, suspecting them of using the navy to keep remote departments like his own subservient and dependent on their centralized governance. The Chief Factor deplored reliance on a system of trade that was so entirely dependent on the vicissitudes of the sea. From the earliest years of his administration, McLoughlin had consistently proclaimed that business on the Columbia would always be conducted from a position of strength and plenty, which "would enable us to meet all

contingencies."¹³ Dependence on a navy was, in the opinion of John McLoughlin, a reckless and foolhardy practice.

Experience confirmed McLoughlin's position. The 1829 wreck of the William & Ann, with the loss of her crew, followed by the loss of the Isabella in 1830, brought the Columbia trade to its knees. As other ships wrecked as a result of human error or turbulent seas, McLoughlin's bias gained momentum. By 1834, after tolerating the naval department as long as he could, McLoughlin publicly challenged the wisdom of the Committee's maritime policy. Standing against the powerful current of Company thought, John McLoughlin proposed an alternative to the sacrosanct position:

...experience has taught us that we can carry on the trade of the coast to more advantage by establishing posts than by vessels and that four posts when established will be kept up at less expense than one Vessel....¹⁴

McLoughlin advanced his argument, outlining the economic advantages of using trading posts in place of ships. He argued that the use of ships required four times the workforce, and produced one-tenth the yield of the trading post. He reasoned that the trading post was more conducive to good relations with the Indian population, who continued to aid in the trapping of beaver. He called into question the competency of the maritime crews, whose miscalculations had already cost the Company dearly.

Though McLoughlin's logic was sound, and his message was indisputable, the Committee in London was affronted by his words. Company officials feared that the Chief Factor in Oregon was becoming perilously close to creating an atmosphere in which permanent settlements would flourish in Columbia country. The naval department was designed to keep the region dependent and unsettled. McLoughlin's antipathy, and the alternatives he proposed were disturbing revelations for the company officials. Their concern for Oregon mounted as new evidence confirmed their suspicions about McLoughlin's dissident practices.

In September of 1835, the Committee learned of another disturbing event developing in the Columbia branch of business. In the autumn of the year, the Chief Factor broached a subject with the Committee that, in itself, might have seemed innocuous and routine. Instead, McLoughlin's words stirred grave concern among the London Committee members. The Chief Factor tendered the idea of expanding the Company's activities on the Columbia beyond the fur, salmon, timber, and farming industries to include the forming of a "hide and tallow Company."¹⁵ The idea was not disturbing in itself. But the proposal included an element that sounded alarms in the minds of the governors. McLoughlin proposed "to form a joint Stock company, in which everyone might subscribe, as much as he thought proper, and to keep it perfectly distinct from the Fur Trade."¹⁶ The members of

the Committee were immediately alarmed, and the action they took was swift and predictable. Naturally, they were amenable toward any idea that increased revenue for the Company. They therefore expressed their interest in the formation of a hide and tallow company. But, as might be expected, they drove a lance into the free-enterprise sections of the plan, and disemboweled it of its joint-stock clauses. Desiring the undivided loyalty of the employees, the Committee responded, "...we think it would be detrimental, if not dangerous to the Fur Trade, were such an establishment, formed by individuals and conducted as a separate concern...."¹⁷ With unprecedented effrontery, the Board of Governors usurped the employees' fecund idea, and ordered the plan to be carried out with the Hudson's Bay Company as sole beneficiary. Carefully sculpting their own proposal to conform to the terms of the Royal License, the Hudson's Bay Company formed the Puget Sound Agriculture Company in 1839. The hide and tallow company was just another means to prevent the rise of local industry and satisfy the Company's voracious appetite for profit. The residents of Oregon who proposed the original idea were disallowed from sharing directly in the profits of the subsidiary.

The Hudson's Bay Company's blatant seizure and exploitation of the hide and tallow company had lasting effects. The Company employees who had originated the idea resented the

exploitive actions of the Company more than ever. The experience deepened their resolve to gain financial independence from the mother Company. More importantly, the residents realized that if they desired to remain in Oregon country beyond the terminus of their contracts, they would have to do so without the approbation of the parent Company. Once again they turned to John McLoughlin for advocacy and support. As usual, the Chief Factor was torn between the uncompromising demands of the Company and the increasingly shrill cry of the engages. The latter, so frequently described by Company officials as docile and cooperative, were becoming cause for concern as they voiced their resolve to remain in Oregon with or without the blessings of the Company. McLoughlin was forced to create a compromise plan in an attempt to satisfy the contentious parties.

The Board of Governors had spared no expense in creating a plan to frustrate the nesting instincts of its employees. The Red River settlement plan was the soul of the scheme, a plan constructed at great expense to the Company. According to the terms of the plan, each family was to be provided with a small tract of land (twenty-five acres), as well as assistance with clothing, tools, seeds, ammunition, and transportation to the settlement. Though the plan was expensive, it was deemed "most economical (sic)...money... well spent."¹⁸ Above all, the Company would be "permanently relieved from a very heavy burden."¹⁹ However,

employees were requesting to remain on the frontier in increasing numbers, and growing more vociferous in their demands, making it difficult if not impossible for the chief factors to enforce the plan in safety. None felt the pressures of the problem more poignantly than John McLoughlin.

Chief Factor McLoughlin purported to carry out the Company policy as long as was prudently possible. In November of 1836 he wrote to the Committee regarding the status of the settlement question, agreeing with their position that as settlement grows, the fur trade diminishes. McLoughlin then admitted, "...I therefore discouraged our people from settling as long as I could without exciting ill Will towards the Company."²⁰ The dispatch to the Committee indicated that McLoughlin had yielded to the demands of the employees out of fear that, if he failed to submit to their request, they would grow hostile towards the Company. The Chief Factor justified his dissonant position, submitting two convincing arguments to the Committee for allowing the French Canadians to remain in Oregon. He held that if the Company permitted them to farm the fertile fields of the Willamette Valley, the Hudson's Bay Company would stand to benefit from their surplus harvests. More convincingly, McLoughlin reasoned that, in the event that hostile opposition ever reared up against the Company, he would have a retinue of sympathetic settlers to assist him in his cause. Surreptitiously, the Chief Factor felt empathy toward the

engages, knowing that they, along with their native wives and children, would never find acceptance in their native homeland. But the deciding factor that tipped the scales in favor of certain employees was McLoughlin's anxiety that if the settlers' demands were not met, they might organize and turn against the Company. While the Chief Factor paid lip service to the Committee's wishes, he put his own compromise plan into effect. He warned Company officials of the need to accede to the employees' wishes:

...who with their children Will Look on the Company as their Benefactors or to prevent them and consequently keep the country to be settled by a people who will most probably feel very differently Inclined towards the Company....²¹

McLoughlin's message was forceful, his words unmistakably clear. Like it or not, settlement in Oregon was a fait accompli, and he had already initiated a course of action that was contrary to the thinking of the Committee.

Surprisingly, the Committee failed to react with the force that McLoughlin anticipated. For its attention had been diverted by still another unexpected development in Oregon, a situation they perceived to be far more threatening than the settlement of a band of sympathetic French Canadians.

In 1834, American trader Nathaniel Wyeth, who had been exploring the region two years prior, returned to Oregon with a party of twenty Americans. Wyeth reported to John McLoughlin that he had come to Oregon "to salt salmon for the Boston market...to equip some American trappers in the

mountains and to farm in the Willamette...."²² Travelling with the Wyeth party were Protestant missionaries, the Reverend Jason Lee and his nephew Daniel Lee, whose stated purpose for coming West was to: "devote their attention to the instruction of the natives."²³ The unexpected arrival of the American party took the Chief Factor and his troops off guard. By 1834, McLoughlin and his retinue had been markedly successful in driving their competitors out of Oregon by using McLoughlin's economic plan of action. This unheralded arrival of the Wyeth party renewed McLoughlin's fears that the security and trade of the Hudson's Bay Company could be jeopardized anew. The cautious Chief Factor instinctively assumed a Janus-like position toward the interlopers, feigning conviviality, while scrutinizing their every move. McLoughlin pressed the Americans into an economic accord. He proposed that the Company would not interfere with the Americans' efforts to salt salmon and outfit the American trappers if their trappers would stay out of the fur trade. As part of the agreement, McLoughlin offered the Wyeth party a limited share in the fur trade of Snake country, a district already deemed useless by Company traders. Beneath his facade of cordiality, McLoughlin feared that Wyeth had the potential "to unite his countrymen in One Body and that he would bring them the Supplies by the Columbia."²⁴ Clearly, McLoughlin's generous offer to Wyeth was designed to bring the quick demise of the American

efforts, but not without giving the Company a share in the Americans' profit. Within three seasons, Wyeth was forced by failure to abandon his Oregon enterprise. The wiley McLoughlin predicted Wyeth's financial collapse, and patiently waited for it to come to pass. But in the process, the Chief Factor's lack of aggressive opposition toward the Americans incurred the Committee's wrath.

McLoughlin's apparent accord with the Americans chilled the souls of the Committee members in London. They were incredulous at the risks McLoughlin was taking with their business, and they were angered at his blatant disregard for their orders of 1828. They warned the Chief Factor once more, "If the American Traders settle near our Establishments they must be opposed, not by violence...but by underselling them, which will damp their sanguine expectations of profit..."²⁵ The Committee was appalled by McLoughlin's offer to allow the Americans to salt salmon and outfit American trappers. They were incensed that McLoughlin had given Americans clearance to trap in the remote Snake River district, even though the area was inaccessible and costly to trap. In short, they interpreted his hospitality and trade offers as a "temporising measure"²⁶ that aided and abetted the efforts of the enemy. Eventually, they summoned him to London to justify these and other highly unconventional business practices.

While the Chief Factor and the Committee were embroiled in debate over the Wyeth episode, the Reverend Jason Lee and his nephew established their mission without contest in the lush Willamette Valley. In a November, 1836, letter to the governing committee, the Chief Factor revealed the missionaries' presence to the already anxious Committee, asking, "can we prevent Missionaries dispersing themselves Among these Indians? I say we cannot even if we were Inclined and if they should succeed in civilizing these Indians it can in no way be an injury to us."²⁷ Convinced that the missionaries would have a beneficial effect on the natives and whites alike, McLoughlin provided them with credit, supplies, and abundant advice. Defending his rationale for giving the missionaries reduced rates at the Company stores, McLoughlin wrote to the Committee that the missionaries "...have no pay and devote themselves in the way they do from a desire to do good to their fellow man...."²⁸

The Chief Factor was initially moved by the apparent altruism of the missionaries, relaxing the customary caution he exercised with strangers. As news reached Fort Vancouver that other missionaries were en route to Oregon, including "the Rev. Mr. Spalding, Dr. Whitman and Mr. Gray,"²⁹ McLoughlin seemed unconcerned. At this time he could not believe that the church community presented any threat to the security of Company interests in Oregon. The Chief Factor did not anticipate that this tiny community was the nucleus

of a religious hegira. Nor could he have known that a well-spring of antipathy toward the London-based enterprise would one day gush forth. For the present, all seemed in order.

Whether the settlers were French Canadian engages, American traders, or Protestant missionaries, Doctor McLoughlin myopically diagnosed a single malady, and prescribed a common antidote. The disease the doctor feared the most was the settlers' potential to unite in force against the Hudson's Bay Company in Oregon. McLoughlin saw symptoms of this feared malady in every group. The Americans, who were loosely scattered throughout the mountains, posed the greatest threat. In the mind of McLoughlin, Nathaniel Wyeth represented the most immediate menace, perceived as having the ability to unite the scattered trappers into an organized body. But the other settlers were not immune to McLoughlin's scrutiny. McLoughlin saw seeds of enmity among the ranks of French Canadian retirees, and he responded to their demands out of serious concern for the safety of the Company

...if we had refused leave to these men to settle or refused them assistance to accomplish their object It would have Disaffected them to the Company, excited their ill will towards us, and Encouraged our opponents to persist in their Endeavors to get a footing in the country....³⁰

Even the Protestant missionaries failed to escape the suspicions of the Chief Factor entirely. In particular, he feared that they, if refused by the Company, would turn to foreign

sources for their supplies, thereby attracting rival markets into the area "...in opposition to us, Give us an immensity of trouble, and Make us Incur great expense."³¹ None escaped the scrutiny of the physician, and none refused his generous offers of credit and supplies from the Company stores.

Like the Committee, Doctor McLoughlin believed that settlement was a very dangerous malady for the trade, one that could weaken and destroy the bone and sinew of the Company. Unlike the Committee, who believed that settlement should have been prevented by an aggressive course of treatment, McLoughlin knew that the outbreak of settlement fever in Oregon was impossible to prevent. Instead, he hoped that by vigorous treatment its effects on the Company could be allayed.

Doctor McLoughlin prescribed an old elixer in a new wrapper. He believed that by rigidly controlling the flow of goods and services through Fort Vancouver, the Hudson's Bay Company could keep the settlement fever in check. The Chief Factor hoped that by keeping the residents permanently indebted to the Hudson's Bay Company stores, and making them dependent on Company goods and supplies, the rise of rival industry could be prevented. At the same time, he hoped that by ingratiating the settlers to the Company in their hour of need, he could win their friendship and favor, allaying their need and desire to establish an independent government.

Doctor John McLoughlin failed to understand the virulence of settlement fever and its resistance to palliative measures. Nor did he appreciate the diversity that existed among the various groups of settlers living in Oregon. Doctor McLoughlin overestimated the efficacy of his medicine, and its ability to permanently counter the side effects of settlement, i.e. independent economy and government.

Throughout the 1830s, virtually every settler in Oregon depended on the goods and services found at the bustling Company settlement at Fort Vancouver. At the same time, others began to search for ways to escape from under the Company's oppressive control. The depth of the settlers' dependence on Fort Vancouver was surpassed only by their longing for economic and political emancipation.

II. ENDNOTES

¹The Governor and Committee to Simpson, January 16, 1928, in Frederick Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire: George Simpson's Journal (rev. ed. Cambridge, 1968), p. 294.

²E.E. Rich, ed., Part of Dispatch From George Simpson Esq Governor of Ruperts Land to the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company London, X, (Toronto, 1947), pp. 67-68.

³Ibid., p. 69.

⁴Governor Simpson to John McLoughlin, March 15, 1829, in Frederick Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire: George Simpson's Journal (rev. ed.; Cambridge, 1968), p. 308.

⁵Burt Brown Barker, ed., Letters of Dr. John McLoughlin Written at Fort Vancouver 1829-1832, (Portland, 1948), p. 95.

⁶E.E. Rich, ed., The Letters of Dr. McLoughlin, IV, pp. 94-95.

⁷Ibid., p. 97.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Simpson's "Character Book," 1832, in E.E. Rich, ed., Letters of Dr. McLoughlin, IV, p. C.

¹¹Frederick Merk, ed., George Simpson's Journal, p. 308.

¹²Simpson's "Character Book," in E.E. Rich, ed., Letters of Dr. McLoughlin, IV, p. C.

¹³Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸R. Harvey Fleming, ed., Minutes of Council Northern Department of Rupert Lands, 1821-31, III, (Toronto, 1940), p. 34.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 35.

²⁰E.E. Rich, ed., Letters of Dr. McLoughlin, IV, pp. 172-3.

²¹Ibid., p. 174.

²²Ibid., p. 128.

²³Ibid., p. 126.

²⁴Ibid., p. 166.

²⁵Extract from a letter from Governor and Committee to George Simpson, January 16, 1828, in E.E. Rich, ed., Part of Dispatch From Governor Simpson, X, (Toronto, 1947), p. 157.

²⁶E.E. Rich, ed., Letters of Dr. McLoughlin, IV, p. 170.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 174-75.